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WANTED POSTERS, BULLETPROOF VESTS, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: DISTINGUISHING TRUE
THREATS FROM COERCIVE POLITICAL ADVOCACY
Leigh Noffsinger
Abstract: In February 1999, an Oregon jury returned a $107 million verdict for doctors
who successfully argued that antiabortion activists' propaganda, in the form of posters and a
web site, constituted true threats in violation of federal law. The judge rejected the activists'
argument that the First Amendment protected their speech and instructed that if a reasonable
person would have foreseen that the communication would be interpreted as threatening, the
jury must find in favor of the plaintiffs. This Comment argues that the dichotomy of analysis
under two leading U.S. Supreme Court cases has led to conflicting standards that provide
insufficient means for evaluating political speech with threatening overtones. While the
Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio provides First Amendment protection for
some of the most radical political speech, if applied to threats its standard would offer too
much protection. The decision in Watts v. United States, on the other hand, offers no First
Amendment protection for true threats but insufficiently defines where coercive advocacy
ends and threats begin. This Comment proposes a synthesized test under which juries first
would apply a four-part definition to distinguish threats from political advocacy, and second
determine whether the speech poses a likelihood of imminent violence. The proposed test
would offer an improved approach for evaluating political speech neither explicitly
threatening nor purely abstract.
"There would seem to be some truth in the adage, 'sticks and stones
can break my bones, but words will never hurt me.' Yet speech often
hurts. It can offend, injure reputation, fan prejudice or passion, and
ignite the world. "'
"Every idea is an incitement. It offers itselffor belief and if believed it
is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. 2
Imagine learning that your name and photograph appear on a poster
under the boldface caption: "WANTED... For Crimes Against
Humanity." An FBI agent contacts you to offer twenty-four-hour
protection and advises you to purchase and wear a bulletproof vest.
Terrified, you alternate which car you drive to work, never allow your
1. Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale LJ. 1105, 1106 (1979).
2. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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family to ride with you, and post an armed guard outside your office.
And the "wanted" poster is just the beginning. The creators of the poster
have discovered the power of technology; next they post your name on
the Internet, under the title "Baby Butcher," along with your addresses at
home and work, telephone numbers, spouse's name, and children's
names. The web site urges people who despise your chosen profession to
follow you to gather information, take pictures, and see that you are
"brought to justice." Then you learn that three others pictured on posters
and named on the web site have since been murdered. Your fear haunts
you every day, and you consider giving up your profession.
Now, on the other hand, suppose you believe the law of the land
facilitates the deaths of more than one million innocents each year. Your
conscience urges you to speak out vehemently on behalf of those forever
silenced, so you form an organization dedicated to overturning the law.
You stage some peaceful protests to draw public attention to your cause,
yet you quickly realize the need for a much stronger publicity campaign
to sway the majority opinion. Outraged and impassioned in your efforts
to change the status quo and believing that a divine higher law must be
obeyed, you pursue a more aggressive approach: you begin "exposing"
those you hold responsible for the deaths. You believe attributing these
violent and deadly actions to real people-people with faces, names,
addresses, and families-will prompt a public outcry demanding change
in the law. You illustrate the problem with "wanted"-style posters
depicting the perpetrators as criminals and outcasts. You also gather
information for a web site, which notes that some who have committed
these violent acts have themselves been killed. While you believe
violence can be justified when used to defend others, you never have
broken the law or physically harmed anyone. Yet perhaps if your
political enemies feel ostracized and intimidated, some innocent lives
will be saved. The next thing you know, you have been ordered to pay
$107 million to those who felt threatened by your political protest.
Unlawful threats warranting injunctions and damage awards? Or
protected political speech under the First Amendment? In evaluating
constitutional protection for such speech, courts generally turn to one of
two leading Supreme Court cases: Brandenburg v. Ohio,3 which holds
that abstract advocacy of dangerous ideas should receive First
Amendment protection,4 or Watts v. United States,5 which holds that true
1210
3. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
4. See id. at 447.
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threats deserve no constitutional protection.' However, no standard
clearly distinguishes protected advocacy from unprotected threats, so
courts evaluating speech have applied inconsistent and often conflicting
rules that become most problematic in cases where the challenged speech
resembles both advocacy and threat.
This Comment argues that courts should adopt a synthesized test for
evaluating First Amendment protection for threatening speech. Part I
presents the facts of Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists,7 a recent case exemplifying problems with the current law as
applied to potentially threatening political speech. Part II summarizes the
two leading U.S. Supreme Court cases that address First Amendment
protection for threatening speech and describes the conflicting rules
developed by the circuit courts' application of these two cases. Part III
argues that courts' application of either one or the other of these Supreme
Court cases should be replaced with a synthesized analysis in which
juries would apply a four-part definition examining the speech's content,
context, audience, and intent to determine whether it constitutes a true
threat; in a second step, the jury would evaluate the speech's likelihood
of resulting in imminent violence. Part IV applies this two-step analysis
to the facts of the Life Activists case.
I. PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE
ACTIISTS: ABORTION PROTESTORS' TACTICS ON TRIAL
In February 1999, after four days of deliberation, an Oregon jury
ordered antiabortion activists to pay $500,000 in compensatory damages
plus $106.5 million in punitive damages8 to a group of abortion providers
who claimed the activists had waged a "campaign of terror and
5. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
6. See id at 707.
7. For decisions involving this lawsuit, see Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999) (issuing permanent injunction against defendants
following jury verdict); Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, No. CIV. 95-
1671-JO, 1999 WL 65450 (D. Or. Feb. 25, 1999) (order and permanent injunction); Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) (denying in
part and granting in part defendants' motion for summary judgment); Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition ofLife Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996) (denying defendants' motion
to dismiss).
8. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Creators of Anti-Abortion Web Site Told to Pay Millions, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
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intimidation" against them in violation of federal statutes.9 The plaintiffs
argued that three items of propaganda constituted unlawful threats: a web
site called The Nuremberg Files0 and two "wanted"-style posters, one
titled "The Deadly Dozen" featuring twelve doctors including three of
the plaintiffs, and the other poster specifically targeting plaintiff Dr.
Robert Crist." The defendants argued that the propaganda contained no
explicitly threatening language and constituted political expression
protected by the First Amendment.'2
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) 3 provided
the primary basis for the suit.'4 Congress enacted the 1994 federal law 5
in response to intensifying confrontations and increasing violence at
abortion clinics. 6 The FACE sections pertinent to the suit provide civil
penalties and damages against anyone who uses a threat of force
intentionally to intimidate someone associated with reproductive health
services. 7 FACE defines "intimidate" as "[placing] a person in
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him or herself or to
9. Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
10. Visualize Abortionists on Trial: The Nuremberg Files (visited Jan. 8, 1999)
<http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/> [hereinafter The Nuremberg Files web site] (on file
with author). The trial court on March 16, 1999, issued a permanent injunction enjoining and
restraining antiabortion activists from distributing any information on The Nuremberg Files web site,
and the site has been either accessible on a restricted basis or inaccessible since the jury verdict. See
Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56.
11. See Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
12. See Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. at 1370.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
14. See Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. at 1362.
15. See Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)).
16. Congress enacted FACE "to protect and promote the public safety and health... by
establishing Federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive
and destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with persons seeking to
obtain or provide reproductive health services." Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694, 694. For a
discussion of antiabortion activists' recent activities, see Angela Christina Couch, Wanted: Privacy
Protection for Doctors Who Perform Abortions, 4 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 361 (1996).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)-(c).
Whoever-(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person
because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or
any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services.., shall be
subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies provided in
subsection (c).
18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
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another."'" However, as FACE explicitly states, the law may not be
construed "to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful
picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal
prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution."' 9
A. The Nuremberg Files Web Site
The stated purpose of The Nuremberg Files web site was:
[C]ollecting dossiers on abortionists in anticipation that one
day we may be able to hold them on trial for crimes against
humanity....
One of the great tragedies of the Nuremberg trials of Nazis
after WWII was that complete information and documented
evidence had not been collected so many war criminals went free or
were only found guilty of minor crimes.
We do not want the same thing to happen when the day comes
to charge abortionists with their crimes. We anticipate the day
when these people will be charged in PERFECTLY LEGAL
COURTS once the tide of this nation's opinion turns against the
wanton slaughter of God's children (as it surely will).2"
The web site contained photographs of fetal body parts and animated
drawings of dripping blood.21 According to court files, an earlier version
of the web site contained the statement "[E]verybody faces a payday
someday, a day when what is sown is reaped."
The first page of The Nuremberg Files web site provided a hypertext
link to another site containing lists of names, titled "Alleged Abortionists
and Their Accomplices." Above the first list, titled "ABORTIONISTS:
the baby butchers," the site provided: "Legend: Black font (working);
Greyed-out Name (wounded); St.kethre (fatality)."24 The site listed
18. 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1) (1994).
20. The Nuremberg Files web site, supra note 10 (emphasis in original).
21. See ia
22. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (D.
Or. 1998).
23. Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices (visited Jan. 8, 1999) <http://www.bestchoice.com/
atrocity/aborts.html> [hereinafterAllegedAbor'onists web site] (on file with author).
24. Id.
1213
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the names of murdered abortion providers David Gunn and John Britton,
among others, indicated as fatalities.' Gunn and Britton had been the
subjects of wanted-style posters similar to the Deadly Dozen poster.26
The site also provided the American Medical Association's web site
address to allow visitors "to search for the location of the baby butcher's
slaughter shop."27
B. The Deadly Dozen Poster
The Deadly Dozen poster contained the boldface heading "GUILTY
of Crimes Against Humanity" followed by another boldface heading,
"THE DEADLY DOZEN," and the names, addresses, and telephone
numbers of twelve people, including three of the plaintiffs.28 Activists
presented the poster at a press conference held during an American
Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA) meeting in 1995 and urged people to
provide information to assist in the prosecution of abortion as a war
crime.29 The poster offered a $5000 reward for "information leading to
[the listed doctors'] arrest, conviction and revocation of license[s] to
practice medicine.""° However, the size and boldness of the print visually
emphasized the words, "GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY... THE DEADLY DOZEN... $5,000 REWARD...
ABORTIONIST."'"
C. The Crist Poster
The poster targeting Dr. Robert Crist, distributed during a 1995
antiabortion conference,32 resembled the Deadly Dozen poster but also
included Dr. Crist's photograph and text describing him as a "notorious
Kansas City abortionist [who] travels to St. Louis weekly to kill babies at
25. See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134-
35 (D. Or. 1999).
26. See id.
27. Alleged Abortionists web site, supra note 23.
28. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D. Or.
1998).
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
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Reproductive Health Services.... He also sometimes kills women."33
The poster then requests, in tiny print, "Please write, leaflet or picket his
neighborhood to expose his blood guilt. Ask Crist to turn from killing
and injuring women and children, to helping and healing those in
need."34 The poster then states "$500 REWARD" in large print, followed
by tiny print, "to any ACLA organization that successfully persuades
Crist to turn from his child killing through activities within ACLA
guidelines."'35
The plaintiffs in the case argued that the web site and posters
constituted threats illegal under federal statutes and unprotected by the
First Amendment. The defendants, however, said the propaganda merely
expressed political ideas and advocated change in the laws protecting
abortion rights.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THREATS AND
ADVOCACY
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases analyzing two
types of potentially threatening speech. In Watts v. United States, the
Court announced that "a threat must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech," holding that "true threats" fall outside
the purview of the First Amendment.36 A few months later, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court greatly expanded First Amendment
protection for speech advocating the use of violence, holding that
abstract advocacy deserves protection unless "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and... likely to incite or produce
such action."'37 Most subsequent lower court decisions have evaluated
potentially threatening speech either under Watts-when the challenged
speech resembles a "true threat"--or under Brandenburg-when the
speech appears to incite others to take some unlawful action-but rarely
under both cases.38
33. Id. at 1186-87.
34. Id. at 1187.
35. Id.
36. See 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
37. See 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
38. See infra Part ll.C.
1215
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A. Watts v. United States: "True Threats " Deserve No First
Amendment Protection
In Watts, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an eighteen-
year-old man prosecuted under a federal statute prohibiting threats
against the life of the President." The man's conviction followed an
antidraft sentiment he voiced during a political rally: "If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,, 40 The
Court considered the conditional nature of the statement, the context of
the political debate, and the audience's reaction of laughter in holding
that the statement constituted "political hyperbole" deserving First
Amendment protection, rather than a threat.4'
The Court held that while true threats are not entitled to First
Amendment protection, some speech appearing threatening on its face
does not rise to the level of a true threat and should receive constitutional
protection. The Court's opinion, however, failed to provide guiding
analysis on how courts should distinguish between the two types of
speech. Instead, the decision offered little more than a directive that
"[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally
protected speech., 42 Because the opinion included no explicit test or
criteria broadly applicable to other cases, the lower courts have
developed a patchwork of tests for assessing whether speech constitutes a
threat unprotected by the First Amendment.43
B. Brandenburg v. Ohio: Abstract Advocacy Receives First
Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio held that the First
Amendment protects speech advocating the necessity of violence as a
concept.' Brandenburg focused on a Ku Klux Klan leader's racist
speech during which he said, "Send the Jews back to Israel.... Bury the
niggers .... We intend to do our part.... We're not a revengent [sic]
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
39. See 394 U.S. at 708 (applying 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1917)).
40. Id. at 706.
41. Id. at 708.
42. Id. at 707.
43. See infra Part II.C.
44. See 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
1216
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continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." 45 The speech took place
during a KKK rally in which twelve people wearing hoods and carrying
firearms burned a large wooden cross. 46 The Court stated, "[T]he mere
abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action."'47 To distinguish protected
advocacy from unprotected speech promoting violence, the Court
specified that speech falls outside First Amendment protection only
"where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
48
The Brandenburg decision rests on the ideal that the First Amendment
should protect even the most dangerous ideas, so long as the ideas have
no likelihood of causing imminent violent action.49 The decision clarified
the change in First Amendment interpretation from the 1920s, when the
Court in Whitney v. California5" had held that words advocating violence
could be prohibited." The Brandenburg Court expressly overruled
Whitney and clarified that advocacy alone could not be punished unless
its goal and likely outcome were to produce "imminent lawless action."52
Brandenburg established a standard protecting advocacy for virtually any
cause or opinion, from anarchy to fascism, so long as the speaker
advocates ideas rather than incites violent action. 3
45. Id. at 446 & n.1 (second notation in original).
46. See id. at 445.
47. Id at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,297-98 (1961)).
48. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
49. See id.
50. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
51. See id. at 371-72.
52. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
53. See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en
banc). The court, relying on Brandenburg, gave the following examples of protected speech:
[A] new sect of religious fanatics [who] announced that unless Chicagoans renounce their sinful
ways it may become necessary to poison the city's water supply, or a newly organized group of
white supremacists [who] vowed to take revenge on Chicago for electing a black
mayor[,] ... [or] Puerto Rican separatists [who] went around Chicago making speeches to the
effect that, if the United States does not grant Puerto Rico independence soon, it will be
necessary to begin terrorist activities on the mainland United States.
Id at 1014.
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C. No Clear Standard Distinguishes True Threats from Abstract
Advocacy
Because most courts have identified Brandenburg and Watts as
separate and alternative approaches for evaluating potentially threatening
language, cases that do not fit neatly into Brandenburg's incitement
definition or Watts' true threat exemption often receive superficial and
inconsistent treatment. Courts' evaluation of threatening speech often
includes evaluation of the speech's content and context, the audience,
and the speaker's intent, yet the analysis varies widely. 4 For example, in
determining First Amendment protection, most courts consider the
message's context,"5 yet some allow a violent atmosphere to provide the
basis for removing protection for speech while others hold that unrelated
violence cannot be the basis for silencing expression. 6 Although courts
often look to the speaker's chosen audience and specificity of the
message," courts have not adopted such criteria as standard
considerations evaluated in all cases. Some courts examine the speaker's
specific intent while others use an objective reasonable person standard. 8
These differences in analysis usually flow from a court's initial decision
to apply Brandenburg's analysis for advocacy or Watts' analysis for true
threats.
1. The Speech 's Content: Specificity of Message Can Indicate
Whether Speech Is Threat or Advocacy
When evaluating whether speech constitutes a threat or advocacy,
most courts begin with the actual words used. A statement that appears
threatening on its face often can form the initial basis for finding a true
threat.5 9 Sometimes, however, meaning is ambiguous or obscure. For
example, in United States v. Fulmer,' a jury convicted the defendant for
threatening an FBI agent in a voicemail message saying, "The silver
54. See infra Part I.C.
55. See infra Part H.C.2.
56. See infra Part II.C.2.
57. See infra Part lI.C.3.
58. See infra Part H.C.4.
59. See, e.g., Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying First
Amendment protection to man who telephoned former work supervisor and said next time
supervisor came by his car lot he would be "toting an ass whipping").
60. 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997).
1218
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bullets are coming."'" In evaluating the words' meaning-ambiguous in
light of the message's innocuous and even cordial tone62 -the trial court
considered testimony about how the statement could be understood, how
news media had used the phrase, and what the defendant meant by the
words. 3 The FBI agent believed the message constituted a death threat,
while the defendant argued that he meant "silver bullets" to describe "a
clear-cut simple violation of law."'  Fulmer had been providing
information to the FBI agent about alleged illegal acts and argued that
"silver bullets" meant the crucial evidence needed.65 The jury found that
the message contained a true threat, and Fulmer received a five-month
prison sentence."
The specificity of the message's content, as well as whether the
speaker explicitly named or implicitly identified a particular target, can
indicate the distinction between threats and advocacy. In Brandenburg,
the speaker chose a broad target consisting of large racial groups rather
than specific individuals, and he failed to specify what "action" the KKK
might take.67 In threat cases, on the other hand, the speaker generally
makes explicit the target and the harm threatened.
When examining content, courts always exercise caution to avoid
making decisions based on approval or disapproval of the ideas
expressed in the speech. The Supreme Court has long applied stringent
standards when evaluating content-based restrictions on speech.68
Nontheless, an examination of content that focuses solely on whether the
specific words chosen constitute a threat does not equate to content-
based discrimination under the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V v.
61. Id. at 1489-90.
62. The message in its entirety said:
Hi Dick, Kevan Fulmer. Hope things are well, hope you had an enjoyable Easter and all the
other holidays since I've spoken with you last. I want you to look something up. It's known as
misprision. Just think of it in terms of misprision of a felony. Hope all is well. The silver bullets
are coming. I'll talk to you. Enjoy the intriguing unraveling of what I said to you. Talk to you,
Dick. It's been a pleasure. Take care.
Id. at 1490.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1489-90.
66. See id.
67. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,446 (1969) (per curiam).
68. For scholarly discussion, see generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975) and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983).
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City of St. Paul.69 "When the basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination
exists."7
While an examination of content often provides the springboard into
analysis of challenged speech, courts never end their evaluation there.
Context lends meaning to content, and courts routinely consider any
context having relevance to the communication.
2. Context of Violence: Classifying Speech as Threat or Advocacy
Changes Evaluation of Surrounding Circumstances
Context provides an essential background for courts to consider when
evaluating speech. The narrow context in which the speaker
communicates-including the surrounding facts, tone of voice, and
manner of the speaker-provides one level of inquiry. Yet to evaluate
fully any subtext or deeper implied message, courts also consider the
broader context in which the speaker communicates. This broader
context can include a general atmosphere of violence surrounding certain
types of speech or past acts of violence. Because the principle of denying
First Amendment protection for threatening speech lies in preventing
fear or risk of physical harm, any related violence can dramatically
lessen the protections given to speech. While the Supreme Court has
limited the degree to which courts may rely on a violent atmosphere in
denying constitutional protection for advocacy, courts routinely consider
evidence of violence-even when unrelated to the speech or the
speaker-in assessing whether speech constitutes a threat. The lack of
clarity about the degree to which a violent context should shape a court's
decision on speech protections has led to the use of inconsistent
standards.
a. Speech in an Atmosphere of Violence
Courts have relied on violent context to deny First Amendment
protection for threats, while granting protection for speech made in a
similar violent context but considered political advocacy. In evaluating
speech presumed a threat, courts have considered a broad range of
69. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
70. Id. at 388.
1220
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contextual facts, from a general atmosphere of violence and intimidation
unrelated to the particular speech at issue, to facts surrounding the
specific situation involving the same speaker or audience. In United
States v. Khorrami,7' for example, the Seventh Circuit considered
terrorism in the Middle East and an atmosphere of anti-Semitism, as well
as bomb threats previously directed to the Jewish National Fund, in
holding that phone messages and mail directed at the organization
constituted threats.' In a case presenting facts very similar to Life
Activists and involving one of its plaintiffs, the Eighth Circuit held in
United States v. Dinwiddie that an antiabortion activist's increasingly
violent words and references to murdered abortion doctors crossed the
line into unprotected speech.74 In assessing the context for her speech, the
court considered the defendant's well-known opinion that lethal force
was warranted to prevent doctors from performing abortions.75 The court
noted that a prior statement by the defendant advocating violence as a
concept, although protected by the First Amendment, could be
introduced to show violent context in a threat case. 6
When evaluating political advocacy under Brandenburg, however, a
violent context cannot provide the basis for suppressing speech. In
Brandenburg, the Court did not consider the broader context of race
relations or the lynchings that historically had followed some cross
burnings. The sole inquiry was whether the speech at issue was directed
toward and likely to produce imminent violence.77 Likewise, in NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware," a 1982 case analyzed under Brandenburg, the
Court held that when the speech at issue failed to result in violence, other
related violence could not justify suppressing the speech.79 In Claiborne
Hardware, white merchants sought an injunction against civil rights
boycott leaders including Charles Evers, who attempted to strengthen the
boycott by telling a group of African-Americans, "If we catch any of you
71. 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. See id. at 1188-89.
73. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
74. See id. at 925-26.
75. See id at 929. The defendant repeatedly used a bullhorn to tell Dr. Robert Crist, "Robert,
remember Dr. Gunn [a physician killed in 1993 by an abortion opponent] .... This could happen to
you.... He is not in the world anymore." Id. at 917.
76. See it at 918, 925.
77. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam).
78. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
79. See id at 908-09.
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going into any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn
neck.""0 While some violent acts occurred later, the Court held that the
speech itself did not "incite lawless action," so it should receive First
Amendment protection."1 Following this precedent, courts using the
Brandenburg test look specifically for a link between the speech and
resulting acts of violence.
In United States v. Dellinger,2 the Seventh Circuit analyzed speech
made by antiwar demonstrators in Chicago that resulted in violent
confrontations with police during the Democratic National Convention of
1968.8 Despite the fact that violence had followed the demonstrators'
speech, the court evaluated each of the defendants' words in determining
which expressions actually incited violence and which did not." In
conducting such a specific analysis, the Court relied on Brandenburg's
rule that speech advocating violence can be denied First Amendment
protection only when likely to incite imminent violence.
8 1
b. Similar Speech Previously Causing Violence
While courts have held it impermissible to sanction political advocacy
because similar prior speech led to violence, courts evaluating allegedly
threatening speech commonly deny constitutional protection where
similar speech on past occasions resulted in violence. Courts evaluating
political advocacy have held that the government may not silence such
speech to prevent potential violence. In Collins v. Jordan,86 for example,
the Ninth Circuit held that the San Francisco mayor and police chief
acted improperly by ordering the arrest of political activists to prevent
violence from ensuing as it had at earlier protests. 7 "The generally
80. Id. at 902.
81. Id. at 928.
82. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
83. See id. at 349-50.
84. See id. at 394-407. The court found that one defendant's announcement nearly four weeks
before the demonstrations that students would "flood the Loop with demonstrators, cause
disturbances in the Loop, and... [that] the Loop would fall" was protected speech. Id. at 395. On
the other hand, the same defendant's statement two weeks later advising demonstration organizers
that people "should try to disrupt traffic, should smash windows, run through the stores and through
the streets[,] ... [and] [g]enerally make havoc in the Loop area" did not constitute protected
advocacy and could be sanctioned. Id.
85. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
86. 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 1371-72.
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accepted way of dealing with unlawful conduct that may be intertwined
with First Amendment activity is to punish it after it occurs, rather than
to prevent the First Amendment activity from occurring in order to
obviate the possible unlawful conduct.""8 Courts analyzing threats, on the
other hand, commonly consider previous violent acts resulting from
speech similar to that being challenged. Juries often hear detailed
evidence about past speech and violent acts when determining whether
the current speech should be viewed as a true threat, even if the
defendants had no link to such violence.89 In employing an objective test,
the factfinder may rely on past resulting violence to find that a
reasonable person would foresee that the current speech would be
interpreted as a threat. Dinwiddie offers an example: the court referred to
past violence by other abortion protestors to uphold the defendant's
conviction for threatening a doctor, even though the evidence showed no
direct connection between the defendant and any actual violence."
c. Speech Having No Violent Result
Speech failing to result in violence or unlawful acts presumptively
receives constitutional protection when the speech is classified as
advocacy but not when the speech is considered a threat. Claiborne
Hardware held that when speech advocating lawlessness fails to result in
violence, courts should presume the speech deserves First Amendment
protection.9'
Under Watts' true threat doctrine, courts hold that threatening speech
can be prohibited without regard to whether actual violence resulted. In
McCalden v. California Library Ass'n,' the Ninth Circuit reviewed
statements by the American Jewish Committee that a library conference
would be disrupted, property would be damaged, and the Library
Association would be "wiped out" if it did not cancel its contract renting
space to a Holocaust revisionist who claimed the Holocaust never
88. Id. (citations omitted); see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007,
1014 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (holding FBI should be free to investigate groups communicating
antigovernment messages before actual violence occurs, but First Amendment prohibits suppression
of speech as preventive measure).
89. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1188 (D. Or. 1998).
90. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 918 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996).
91. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 908-09 (1982).
92. 955 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1992).
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occurred.93 Even though the speech contained no overt threat of bodily
harm and no actual harm resulted, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware, saying those cases "involved
public speeches advocating violence, not privately communicated threats
of violence as are alleged here."'94 Thus, while courts routinely consider
context in determining First Amendment protection for speech, courts
place different importance on the role of a violent atmosphere or specific
violent acts, depending on whether they view the speech at issue as
political advocacy or as a threat.
3. The Audience: General Audience or Specific Target Can Indicate
Whether Speech Is Threat or Advocacy
Consideration of the speaker's chosen audience often illuminates the
line between protected speech and unprotected threats. For example, the
court in Dinwiddie acknowledged that the defendant's prior statements
supporting murder as justifiable homicide to prevent abortion constituted
protected advocacy; however, once she turned her opinion toward a
specific doctor in a face-to-face confrontation, the court found the speech
constituted a threat.95 Similarly, in Khorrami, the defendant's words
"death to all Jews" likely would have been protected as general advocacy
of an opinion had they not been spoken onto the Jewish National Fund's
answering machine.96 The distinction between directing speech toward a
general audience or a specific target also could explain the different
outcomes in Brandenburg, in which a cross was burned at a private KKK
rally, and United States v. J.H.., 9 where the defendants burned a cross
in an African-American family's fenced-in backyard.9 The Supreme
Court in Cohen v. California9 acknowledged that speech directed at the
general public should be viewed differently from speech directed at a
particular person."°
93. See id. at 1217.
94. Id. at 1222.
95. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 929.
96. See United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1990).
97. 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994).
98. See id. at 823.
99. 403 U.S. 15 (1970).
100. See id. at 20-23 (1970) In evaluating a case against a man who wore a jacket bearing the
message "Fuck the draft," the Court noted that if man had directed his speech toward a specific
"person of the hearer," such targeting would provide one piece of evidence supporting restrictions on
1224
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The majority of cases analyzed under Watts have involved face-to-
face threats made in an obvious attempt to intimidate, such as a suspect
threatening to assault the police officer arresting him." In such cases,
the speaker specifically directs comments to the target of the threat.
Courts generally have no problem deciding that such speech does not
deserve First Amendment protection under both Watts and a 1942
Supreme Court decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,'2 which held
that "fighting words" threatening or provoking physical assault are
outside the scope of First Amendment protection. 3
Even when the speaker names a specific target, though, courts
generally consider other factors as well. As an example, in Watts the
defendant named "L.B.J." as his target, yet the Court also considered the
audience to whom Watts addressed the speech in holding that the speech
constituted political hyperbole." Similarly, the Court in Claiborne
Hardware determined that the speech should be viewed as part of a
legitimate political movement, even though Charles Evers directly
threatened the audience with physical violence if they broke the
boycott.10
5
Courts considering the speaker's chosen audience also evaluate the
audience's reaction to the speech. From the reaction of laughter in
Watts "'6 to the reaction of fear in Dinwiddie,0 7 courts consistently remain
cognizant of the reaction prompted by the speech. While the audience's
reaction cannot dictate the First Amendment protection afforded, courts
do consider a reaction of fear as evidence that the message reached a
speech. Id "No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words
on [Cohen's] jacket as a direct personal insult. ... There is... no showing that anyone who saw
Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that [he] intended such a result." Ld
101. See United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding
conviction of defendant who told federal law enforcement officer, "Make these handcuffs off and
I'll kick your fucking ass.... Somebody is going to die."); see also United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d
264, 265 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding conviction of defendant who told bank employees, "'Y-ou all
better have my personal items to me by five o'clock today or it's going to be a lot of hurt people
there.').
102. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
103. See id. at 569, 572 (upholding conviction under state law prohibiting "offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any.., public place" because "fighting
words" receive no First Amendment protection).
104. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
105. See NAACP v. Clalborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
106. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
107. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 1990).
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specific target and resulted in intimidation, which would indicate a
frightening content, a violent context, or an intent to intimidate.
4. The Speaker's Intent: Courts Inconsistently Consider Defendants'
Subjective Desire to Threaten or to Communicate Ideas
When evaluating alleged threats, most circuits-rather than
determining whether the speaker actually intended to threaten-apply an
objective test asking whether a reasonable person would interpret the
speech as a threat." 8 This objective test has taken various forms, some
focused on a reasonable speaker and some on a reasonable listener, and
has resulted in widely divergent outcomes.'09
Brandenburg's inquiry into whether the speech at issue was "directed"
to inciting violence seems to imply that some requisite intent by the
speaker must exist before constitutional protections for political
advocacy are denied. While Brandenburg applies to advocacy cases,
some courts also have looked for specific intent on the part of the
speaker when evaluating threats under Watts. In J.H.H., the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the convictions of juveniles who burned crosses in the
fenced yard of an African-American family to scare the family into
leaving the neighborhood."0 Although the boys' expressive acts closely
resembled those given First Amendment protection in Brandenburg, the
J.HH. court distinguished the case based on the boys' subjective intent
108. See, e.g., Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
context of increasing school violence when reversing trial court's finding that student's statement to
school counselor was protected by First Amendment. Student claimed her statement, "I'm so angry,
I could just shoot someone!" constituted figure of speech; counselor reported that student said, "If
you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you!"); United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d
550, 551 n.2, 557 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding First Amendment did not shield defendant who sent letter
to ex-wife's attorney saying, "Every time I read about yet another nasty judge or disgusting shyster
killed, I rejoice: 'Great! One less piece of shit to terrorize us decent people!"' Though defendant
said he intended only to express anger rather than threaten and no actual violence resulted, court
upheld conviction.).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997) (considering whether
communication "in its context.., would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its
originator will act according to its tenor") (citations omitted); Aman, 31 F.3d at 553 (considering
whether "reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted ... as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm") (citations omitted); United States v. Malik, 16
F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering whether "an ordinary, reasonable recipient... familiar with
the context.., would interpret [the statement] as a threat of injury") (citations omitted); United
States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (considering that if reasonable
recipient would interpret communication as threat, issue should go to jury).
110. See United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1994).
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to threaten and intimidate the family, contrasted with Brandenburg's
intent to communicate ideas."' Using a similar subjective intent
requirement, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Lee"2 reached an
opposite result despite facts quite similar to J.H." The appeals court,
in reversing Lee's conviction and remanding for a new trial, held that the
First Amendment protected Lee's action because the prosecution -had
failed to prove the two elements required by Brandenburg: that the
defendant intended to incite violence and that such violence likely would
result 1
4
In United States v. Kelner, "5 the Second Circuit combined elements of
analysis from both Watts and Brandenburg to find a true threat."6 The
government charged the defendant under a federal statute after he
announced to news reporters that his group intended to assassinate
Yasser Arafat."' In interpreting the speech, which contained a political
message as well as a threat, the court held that because evidence showed
the defendant had specific intent to execute his threat, the speech was not
protected."' This analysis combined Brandenburg's implied requirement
of specific intent, along with Watts' principle that serious threats receive
no constitutional protection.
In overturning the conviction of a college student who posted fictional
stories on the Internet describing rape, torture, and murder of young
women and girls, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Alkhabaz"9 held
that a true threat must meet both mens rea and actus reus
requirements." In one story, the defendant used a classmate's name for
111. See id at 825-26.
112 6F.3d 1297 (Sth Cir. 1993).
113. See id. at 1297-98.
114. Seeid at 1304.
115. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
116. See id at 1027 (holding that defendant's statements constituted true threat that "on its face
and in the circumstances [was] ... so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the
person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution").
117. See id. at 1020-21. During a visit to the United States by the Arab leader, Kelner said, "We
have people who have been trained and who are out now and who intend to make sure that Arafat
and his lieutenants do not leave this country alive..., We are planning to assassinate Mr.
Arafat ... Everything is planned in detail." Id. at 1021.
118. Seeid. at 1027.
119. 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
120. See id. at 1495. Actus reus is "the physical aspect of a crime, whereas the mens rea (guilty
mind) involves the intent factor." Black's Law Dictionary 22 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
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the story's victim.121 The court held that the man made no threat because
he had neither the intent to intimidate nor the intent to execute the acts he
described.1
22
III. PROPOSAL: A FOUR-PART DEFINITION DISTINGUISHING
THREATS FROM ADVOCACY
Because speech can be ambiguous and difficult to categorize, the
distinction between subtle threats and coercive advocacy can be difficult
to draw.'" As a result of the existing dichotomy in analysis of threats and
advocacy, a court's initial determination of how to classify the speech at
issue can significantly alter case outcomes. While courts exercise careful
scrutiny of advocacy before rejecting a First Amendment defense under
Brandenburg, courts generally employ minimal scrutiny once catego-
rizing speech as a threat under Watts.'24 Because this decision to evaluate
speech as a threat or as advocacy can dramatically change the
constitutional protection afforded, courts should employ the same
analysis in all cases. The problem lies not in the shortcomings of the
rules presented by Watts and Brandenburg but instead in the lack of any
clear definition to distinguish threats from advocacy. 2 The Life Activists
case highlights the shortcomings of current analysis as applied to
politically motivated speech, made in the context of related violence, and
understood by others as threats.
126
Evaluating potentially threatening speech should be a two-part
process. The jury first should determine whether the speech meets the
definition of a true threat; if the evidence shows that the speech
121. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.
122. See id at 1496; see also United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(finding that defendant's e-mail message to unidentified recipient did not constitute true threat
because he expressed only desire, not intention, to kidnap and torture girls).
123. See United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1983).
124. See Robert Kurman Kelner, Note, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the
First Amendment, 84 Va. L. Rev. 287, 289 (1998).
125. See David R. Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 6 Win. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 733, 738-42 (1998).
126. See David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and
the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 2, 5 (1994). "[I]n spite of the deference
that we grant to speech falling short ofactual incitement to crime, and in spite of our recognition that
there are prohibited utterances that cross the line, a borderland remains in which clever speakers can
hide, with form, the substance of what they say." Id. at 1-2; see also Alan M. Kratz, Note,
Unpopular Advocacy Versus True Threat: United States v. J.H.R, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 823, 848-
53 (1995).
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constitutes a true threat, no First Amendment protection should be given
and no further analysis is required. Similarly, in cases where the plaintiff
brings suit only under a threat theory, the analysis need not proceed
beyond the jury's inquiry into whether the speech in fact rises to the level
of a threat. If the evidence does not support finding a true threat,
however, the jury should assess whether the speaker directed the speech
to incite violence and whether the speech was likely to incite imminent
violence. 2 '
A. Evaluating Content, Context, Audience, and Intent to Distinguish
Threats from Advocacy
For purposes of instructing a jury and reviewing facts on appeal,
courts should adopt the following definition: A true threat exists when a
communication threatening physical harm is directed to the target,
intended to intimidate or interfere with the target's freedom of action,
and reasonably believed in context to have some likelihood of resulting
in violence. 2' This definition, deconstructed and framed as four broad
inquiries, would require factfinders to consider evidence of the
following:
1. The speech's content: Would a reasonable person understand
the message as a threat of bodily harm?
2. The context: Did the atmosphere lend threatening meaning to
the communication?
3. The audience: Was the communication sufficiently directed
toward or reasonably believed to reach the target?
4. The speaker's intent: Did the speaker intend to intimidate or
interfere with the target's freedom of action?
127. See Cass R Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem ofFree Speech 123-24 (1993).
[M]uch of free speech law should have a simple structure. The first question is: Does the speech
at issue fall inside the constitutional core? If so, it can be regulated only on the gravest showing
of harm. A protest against a war cannot be stopped unless the protest is nearly certain to cause
immediate and serious harm.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1030 (abr. 6th ed. 1991) (defining threat as "communi-
cated intent to inflict physical or other harm on any person... [or a] declaration of one's purpose or
intention to work injury to the person, property, or rights of another, with a view of restraining such
person's freedom of action").
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This method for identifying threats draws upon existing criteria and
authority to provide guidance to courts assessing whether speech
constitutes an unlawful threat or protected political advocacy. 
129
In distinguishing threats from constitutionally protected expression,
juries should routinely consider these four factors together. Examination
of these evidentiary elements would inform the jury's determination of
whether the speech constitutes a threat but should not be viewed as a
"test" in which the presence of any "threatening" element would remove
First Amendment protection or the absence of an element would demand
protection. For example, the content of some speech may appear facially
threatening, but the speaker's intent, the context, and the audience will
indicate that the speech did not constitute a true threat. An actress on
stage clearly may say, "You will die by hand tonight!" In other
situations, the speaker may intend to threaten and use threatening words
directed at his target, but the speech nonetheless fails to rise to the level
of a true threat because of the context. For example, the First
Amendment allows a football player to tell an opposing quarterback,
"You'll need a stretcher after this play, because I'm going to hurt you!"
In yet another example, neither the words nor the context may appear
threatening, yet the intent could in fact indicate a true threat. This
category would reach the mob boss who invites an enemy to join him for
a drink, and then says, "Tell your uncle I'm sending our friend Jimmy to
pay him a visit."
Courts commonly consider various combinations of these four factors
when evaluating speech. In Watts, the Court considered the antidraft
sentiment and the conditional words used (the content), the political
debate at which the speech was made (the context), the crowd's reaction
of laughter (the audience), and the defendant's use of hyperbole to
express an opinion (the intent).30 In Brandenburg, the Court noted the
conditional nature of the language used and the generality of the targeted
groups (the content), the private political rally (the context), the group of
like-minded people to whom the speech was directed (the audience), and
the speaker's apparent desire to urge political figures to adopt the Klan's
129. See supra Part fl.C; see also Crump, supra note 126, at 5 1. Crump suggests eight evidentiary
factors to consider in identifying incitement. While his proposal focuses on advocacy rather than
threats and seems unnecessarily complex, it does urge consideration of the speech's express words
or content, the expression's context and audience, and the speaker's knowledge or disregard of the
likelihood of violent results. See id.
130. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam).
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white supremacist viewpoint (the intent).' While courts regularly look
to these factors when evaluating speech, different courts have articulated
their considerations differently or weighed one factor more heavily while
ignoring others. By adopting a synthesized test for distinguishing threats
from advocacy, courts would assess constitutional rights more
systematically.
1. Content Reasonably Understood as a Threat ofBodly Harm
Courts commonly distinguish protected speech from certain limited
categories of unprotected speech based on eontentm--the actual
language used or communication made. Cases dealing with First
Amendment protection for potentially threatening speech generally
contain a direct quote of the actual words used.133 Examining speech's
face value, however, should provide only the first step in determining
meaning.14 Hess v. Indiana'35 offers an example of the errors that can be
made when words are interpreted in an excessively literal manner. In that
case, the defendant engaged in a demonstration that blocked traffic on a
public street.'36 When the sheriff and deputies attempted to clear the
blockage, Hess loudly said, "We'll take the fucking street later!"' 37 The
Supreme Court held that Hess' speech constituted protected speech
because nothing in the words themselves urged violence or law
violations.'38 As the dissent noted, however, "Surely the sentence.., is
susceptible of characterization as an exhortation, particularly when
uttered in a loud voice facing a crowd."'39 Court evaluations of speech
protection cannot be bound by strictly literal interpretations. In Hess, an
131. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,445-48 (1969) (per curiam).
132. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Shackelford v. Shirley,
948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991) ("As speech strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue
and free exchange of ideas the first amendment was designed to protect, and moves toward threats
made with specific intent to perform illegal acts, the state has greater latitude to... effectively
neutralize verbal expression.").
133. See, e.g., supra notes 59, 62, 75, 84.
134. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 31 (1965) ("Words do not make the actor liable
for assault unless together with other acts or circumstances they put the other in reasonable
apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact with his person.").
135. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
136. See id. at 106-07.
137. Id. at 107.
138. See id. at 108-09.
139. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
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evaluation of the speaker's intent and the context of his statement, which
the court inadequately addressed, could have led to a conclusion that the
speaker intended to incite the crowd to resist the officers forcefully, or
that he intended to threaten the police with future violent action. In fact,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that very similar speech, "Don't let the
pigs take the hill," did in fact constitute unprotected incitement based on
the speaker's intent and the audience to whom the words were
directed. 4 When examining content-the first line of inquiry in
evaluating speech-juries and courts should examine not only the literal
words but also any implicit message.
Words threatening nonviolent action should not be considered true
threats unprotected by the First Amendment. Despite the Ninth Circuit's
holding in McCalden,141 threats of economic harm or business disruption
should not be considered true threats; a rule to the contrary would
remove First Amendment protection for much expression vital to our
society, such as threats of labor strikes or boycotts. Similarly, words
suggesting that the target's actions will result in public humiliation,
financial ruin, or social ostracism-tactics commonly used in product
boycotts and political races-should not be considered true threats.
2. Context Associated with Speaker Giving the Message Threatening
Meaning
The second evidentiary factor in determining whether speech
constitutes a threat should be the context: do contextual facts indicate
that the speech reasonably would be understood as an expression of ideas
or an attempt to cause fear? The context considered, however, must be
limited to the context the speaker reasonably could expect others to
associate with his or her actions and communication.' The Supreme
Court often has looked to context as a critical factor in evaluating
speech.'43
140. Unites States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1972).
141. See McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1992).
142. See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1497 (Ist Cir. 1997) (holding that trial court
erred in allowing testimony about Oklahoma City bombing in assessing whether defendant's
unrelated words, "The silver bullets are coming," constituted threat).
143. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918); see also United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45,
50 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Prochaska, 222 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1955)).
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Certain speech, because of its context, should be subject to a strict
liability standard regardless of the speaker's intent. For instance, making
a joke about semiautomatic weapons would not be protected speech at an
airport security checkpoint; even if intended as a political statement
about international terrorism, security guards would understand the
speech in context as a serious threat, which exempts the speech from
First Amendment protection. Threats against the President of the United
States generally receive strict liability treatment as well, regardless of the
speaker's intent.1" While Watts offers an obvious exception, most cases
dealing with threats against the President apply minimal scrutiny before
denying constitutional protection. 45 Similarly, the classic example of
falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater should not be given First
Amendment protection. Because of its ability to prompt action with
potentially harmful results such as panic or stampede, the speech in
context will not be given constitutional privilege, even if the speaker
intends merely to test theater employees' emergency preparedness.
Courts have applied the equivalent of strict liability to speech in certain
contexts, regardless of the speaker's intent or whether any overt acts
resulted.
3. Message Reasonably Believed to Reach the Target Audience
Examining the speaker's chosen audience and the audience's reaction
also can assist courts in determining whether particular speech
constitutes a threat. Words interpreted as simple advocacy in the context
of a speech to a sympathetic audience might instead be interpreted as a
threat when addressed directly to a target of action contemplated by the
speech. For example, if the defendant in Brandenburg had said directly
to an African-American family that he believed Caucasian people should
"bury the niggers," that speech likely would have been classified a true
threat under Watts and would not have received First Amendment
protection. But because Brandenburg's words contained no specifically
named target and instead were directed to sympathetic third parties, the
144. See, e.g., United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965-66 (1lth Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(affirming conviction of defendant who threatened Reagan and Bush and later said he intended
statement to be political hyperbole).
145. See iat
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Court classified his speech as protected advocacy of racist ideas.
Similarly, if Watts had made his statement to a drill sergeant the first day
of basic training, the statement likely would have been considered a true
threat based on the chosen audience.
A communication need not be explicitly directed to the target,
however, if the message foreseeably would reach the target or an agent
of the target. Letters sent to the Secret Service threatening the President,
for example, are sufficiently targeted to constitute true threats.
146
4. Speaker Intended to Cause Intimidation or Fear
In identifying whether particular speech constitutes a true threat,
courts should look to the speaker's intent. If the speaker intended or
knowingly disregarded that the speech would cause intimidation and
fear, the intent requirement would be satisfied. The standard articulated
in Alkhabaz, requiring that the communication's purpose be "to effect
some change or achieve some goal through intimidation," would provide
one basis for finding intent under the proposed test.'47 By also including
speech made with knowing disregard of its likely threatening effects, the
proposed standard would deny constitutional protection for Alkhabaz if
the government could prove he knew, even if he did not intend, that his
use of a classmate's name in a story about rape and torture would
intimidate her. 4 '
Many cases evaluating cross burning have relied on an analysis of
intent: 49 When a cross is burned solely with the intent to intimidate, a
court should find a true threat. However, if the purpose is to
communicate ideas of white supremacy and not to intimidate, even when
fear results, the speech contains social value as an exposition of ideas
and should be given First Amendment protection. 5' A subtle distinction
here exists: if the speaker does not intend to intimidate but fear results
unexpectedly, the intent requirement is not met; yet if the speaker
146. See id. at 965.
147. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997).
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1994); supra Part IL.C.4.
150. See supra Part II.C.4.
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apathetically expects that his speech will intimidate, the intent
requirement may be proven through evidence.'
Intent to execute the threat, which was required by the Second Circuit
in Kelner,"' imposes a standard higher than necessary. In comparison,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates a lower standard-to hold
an actor liable for making a threat, "it is not necessary that he have or
that he believe that he has the ability to inflict the harmful or bodily
contact which his act apparently threatens."''
Consideration of the speaker's intent would encompass most of the
true threat cases now evaluated under Watts, in which the speaker desires
only to cause fear of bodily harm. Evaluating the speaker's purpose also
would protect a clumsy or inarticulate speaker from liability for speech
never intended as a threat."M While impossible to know a speaker's
thoughts and true intent, jurors should consider evidence of intent just as.
they would assess mens rea for any crime or cause of action requiring
specific intent. Under the purely objective test now used in many
circuits,'55 the reasonable person standard that disregards the speaker's
actual purpose can result in liability for "negligent" speech.'56
151. Other courts also have indicated that intent should be a primary factor in assessing First
Amendment protection. For example, the Ninth Circuit, despite its adoption of an objective standard
in assessing true threats, had explicitly stated in an earlier case that "intent [is] ... the determinative
factor separating protected expression from unprotected criminal behavior," while indicating that
such determination of intent should be made by the trier of fact. United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d
1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand, 884 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting defendant's
argument that subtle language containing no explicit message of impending harm could not
constitute criminal threat).
152. See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976).
153. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 33 (1965).
154. But see supra Part IILA.2 for a discussion of strict liability speech.
155. See supra Part ILC.4.
156. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under an
objective test,
the defendant is subject to prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be interpreted as
a threat, regardless of the speaker's intention. In essence the objective interpretation embodies a
negligence standard, charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements
on his listeners. We have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in
criminal statutes.... [W]e should be particularly wary of adopting such a standard for a statute
that regulates pure speech.
Id (citations omitted).
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Constitutional protection demands that a higher standard be applied to
speech.'57
B. Evaluating Speech 's Likelihood to Incite Imminent Violence
If a jury determines that speech meets the definition of a true threat,
no First Amendment protection should be given. In the alternative, if the
jury determines that the speech did not constitute a true threat but was
directed toward inciting violence, the jury should assess the speech's
likelihood of producing imminent violence. If a high likelihood of
imminently resulting violence exists, the jury should not accept a First
Amendment defense. This second inquiry satisfies the requirement of the
Brandenburg test.'58
IV. FOUR-PART DEFINITION APPLIED TO LIFE ACTIVISTS
A two-step analysis synthesizing Brandenburg and Watts would not
change the outcomes of cases with facts analogous to those two cases,
yet a consistently employed analysis would provide more thorough
scrutiny for cases such as Life Activists where political advocacy contains
threatening undertones. The plaintiffs in Life Activists based their case on
the theory that the activists' speech constituted a true threat, not on the
theory that it incited violence. As a result, in a pre-trial ruling the judge
dismissed the defendants' assertions that the Brandenburg test should be
used. The judge's analysis consisted of just one footnote, explaining,
"Plaintiffs are not pursuing an incitement to violence theory,"'' 59 so the
second step evaluating the speech's likelihood of causing imminent
violence would be unnecessary. Evaluating the case under threat
analysis, though, the district court judge instructed the jury to determine
157. See Memorandum of ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Amicus Curiae, Regarding
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 19-28, Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition
of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) (Civ. No. 95-1671-JO); Memorandum of ACLU
Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Amicus Curiae, Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss at 7-10,
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996) (Civ.
No. 95-1671-JO).
158. Such analysis also may benefit from the consistent use of more explicit factors to identify
when speech satisfies Brandenburg's requirements. That issue, however, is beyond the scope of this
Comment
159. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1371 n.13
(D. Or. 1996).
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whether the activists' speech met the Ninth Circuit standard for true
threats. The district judge's instructions to the jury stated:
A statement is a "true threat" when a reasonable person making the
statement would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom it is communicated as a serious expression of an
intent to bodily harm or assault. This is an objective standard-that
of a reasonable person. Defendants' subjective intent or motive is
not the standard that you must apply in this case.)"
Using this standard, the jury found the speech did constitute a true
threat.' 6' An evaluation of the content, context, audience, and intent of
the activists' speech, however, highlights the many difficult questions of
fact in a case like Life Activists. A jury verdict either for or against the
plaintiffs likely could have been defended on appeal; strong arguments
exist for both sides. The problem in the Life Activists case lies not
necessarily in the outcome but rather in the court's effort at
distinguishing true threats from political advocacy. Had the court
instructed the jury using the proposed four-part definition of threat, the
jury would have been given a more methodical approach for reaching its
decision. The verdict, for either the plaintiffs or the defendants, would be
160. Jury Instruction No. 10, Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists (D. Or.
1999) (Civ. No. 95-1671-JO). The instruction farther states:
[E]ven if you believe that the defendants did not intend the statements to be .threatening, you
must still find those statements to be threats if you conclude that a reasonable person would
have foreseen that those statements, in their entire factual context, would have been interpreted
as statements of an intent to bodily harm or assault.
... The word "context" means all of the facts and information that would have been known to
the person making the statement, including the events surrounding each publication of the
statement and the reaction of the listeners to it. ... In evaluating context, you should also
consider evidence presented by the defense of non-violence and permissive exercise of free
speech.
... The evidence concerning other posters, other statements and actions, history of violence,
including the violent actions of others you have heard evidence about, and defendants'
subjective motives are admissible to show the context or circumstances in which the defendants
allegedly made the statements, and which you must consider in determining whether a
reasonable person should have foreseen that any of the three statements at issue would be
interpreted as threats.
... Further, you need not find that the defendants intended to carry out the threat or were even
capable of carrying out the threat in order to find that a statement was, in fact, a threat. Nor must
you find that any of the defendants actually intended to threaten plaintiffs, so long as you find
that a reasonable person would have foreseen that it would be understood to be threatening.
Id.
161. See Verhovek, supra note 8.
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grounded on more thorough evaluation of the evidence. The Life
Activists case exemplifies a challenging case in which political advocacy
and threats of violence have become entwined. For this very reason, a
systematic examination of specific issues of fact must be carefully
conducted. The proposed definition of true threats can provide such
guidance.
A. The Content
The content of the abortion protestors' speech contained an inherently
political message including no explicit threats of violence. The words'
literal interpretation urged only lawful methods of peaceful protest.
While the web site and posters included inflammatory language, much of
it expressed the activists' opinion that abortion constitutes murder.
Therefore, on its face, the language could be interpreted strictly as
describing what the activists viewed as violence committed by the
doctors, rather than violence intended by the activists. Similarly,
although The Nuremberg Files web site contained a list of abortion
providers with a legend indicating those killed or injured, such
information constitutes factual matters and cannot on its face be deemed
a true threat. Based on its ambiguity and lack of specificity, the language
alone cannot prove that the activists intended to threaten or incite
violence. In a different context, one could imagine abortion rights
supporters compiling a nearly identical list to document the violence
against abortion doctors and to urge heightened protection for clinics.
Therein lies the central inquiry: in context, did the words convey a
meaning different from the literal message, understood both by the
activists and by the audience?
B. The Context
In one context, the activists' speech could be understood as
impassioned political propaganda. The speech contained no explicitly
threatening words, and District Judge Robert E. Jones acknowledged,
"Significantly[,]. . . no statement contained in the text of the Deadly
Dozen poster, the Crist poster, or The Nuremberg Files is expressly
1238
Vol. 74:1209, 1999
Threats and Advocacy Under the First Amendment
threatening, in the sense that there are no 'quotable quotes' calling for
violence against the targeted providers." 62
On the other hand, the plaintiffs showed evidence of a correlation
between past posters targeting specific doctors and the subsequent
murder of the particular doctors named, as well as evidence that several
of the defendants had signed petitions supporting those prosecuted for
the killings. 63 Additional evidence showed that the Deadly Dozen poster,
first published in January 1995, included the name of an abortion doctor
who had been shot in both arms in August 1993.1' The fact that the
shooting predated the poster indicates that the activists knew a
correlation would be drawn between the poster and actual violence. After
the shooting but before the publication of the Deadly Dozen poster, one
of the Life Activists defendants wrote in an antiabortion publication that
the defendant charged in the shooting was a "courageous" woman with
whom "we were very proud to be associated." '65
C. The Audience
In most true threat cases, the recipient of the communication also is
the target of the threat or an agent of the target.'6 In Life Activists, the
activists did not communicate their message directly to targeted doctors.
Rather than being distributed at an event or location where immediate
lawless action might be foreseeable, such as an on-site abortion clinic
protest, the Deadly Dozen and Crist posters were distributed to fellow
activists at antiabortion rallies in Washington, D.C., and St. Louis,
Missouri. 67 No evidence showed that the named abortion doctors were
anywhere near the rallies or were the direct audience of any implied
threats contained in the posters.
168
162. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D.
Or. 1998).
163. See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134
(D. Or. 1999).
164. Seeid at l132.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., United States v. McDermott 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cox,
957 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.3d 1186 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964 (1 th Cir. 1983).
167. See Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-32.
168. See id.
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The activists made The Nuremberg Files available to the general
public on the World Wide Web. While not directly communicating to the
targeted doctors, the activists could reasonably believe that the doctors
would learn of the site and its contents. The web site provided
unrestricted access to anyone with a modem and a web browser. In fact,
the doctors did become aware of the web site and did feel threatened.
D. The Intent
Perhaps the activists' intent in distributing the "wanted" posters was to
communicate strong feelings about a heated political issue. While some
may argue that the activists intended to intimidate the doctors, this alone
should not be the basis for denying First Amendment protection. People
often use words to intimidate. As an example, consider the priest who
tells a group of young choir boys, trembling with fear, that they will
suffer eternal damnation and hellfire if they fail to follow God's
teachings. The priest intends to make the boys fearful of what might
occur should they stray from the righteous path. The fact that words are
intended to induce fear does not alone satisfy the test for true threats
when the action threatened is not unlawful or violent.
The stated premise of The Nuremberg Files web site was to collect
information on abortion doctors, in the fanciful hope that they would be
prosecuted for murder some day.'69 Such a premise, now viewed as
fictional and highly unlikely, to some degree undercuts any potentially
threatening interpretation; much like Watts' political hyperbole, the web
site could be interpreted as an extreme way of intertwining strong
feelings about abortion with an imaginative concept of how justice could
be done. On the other hand, the stated premise may be a subterfuge, and
the primary purpose may actually be intimidation. If the activists truly
did not intend to cause intimidation or make the doctors fearful enough
to stop performing abortions, one would assume their activities would
end once they learned of the extreme safety precautions taken by the
doctors as a result of the posters and web site. Many aspects of the
activists' speech indicate that they did intend to intimidate: the inclusion
of the doctors' home addresses and their children's names on the web
site, the posters' large and small typeface that emphasized the most
threatening words while de-emphasizing the innocuous message, and the
1240
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Life Activists' publicly stated position justifying homicide to prevent
abortion all support the argument that the activists intended to cause fear.
Perhaps the most challenging factual question presented by Life
Activists can be seen in the subtle distinction between intending to cause
fear and intending to create opprobrium in the community that might
make those targeted more vulnerable to violence. If one believes that the
activists meant no harm to the doctors, the question becomes whether the
activists can incur liability based on others' increased ability to carry out
violence because of the heightened public spotlight on the doctors. The
Life Activists case presents extremely difficult factual questions that
cannot be easily resolved. Use of the four-part test, however, would
ensure a more thorough and systematic application of the principles of
Watts, Brandenburg, and related' circuit court precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
As a society, we refuse to tolerate threats. We believe that law-abiding
citizens should be permitted to go about their private business without
having to wear bulletproof vests, watch their backs, or live in fear. Yet
we also live in a country founded on the principle that political debate
should be robust, and the government should not be permitted to silence
unpopular speech. A guarantee of free political speech gives our
democratic government its solid foundation.
These values collide in cases like Life Activists, where political
advocacy is wedded, intentionally or not, to underlying intimidation.
While Brandenburg and Watts offer solid principles for determining First
Amendment application to dangerous speech, the precedent developed
under them has resulted in inconsistent and unpredictable protection for
political speech. Courts should follow a two-step analysis, synthesizing
Brandenburg and Watts and firmly rooted in circuit court precedent,
which would assist courts in identifying threats while providing due
protection to political advocacy. By instructing juries to evaluate the
content, context, audience, and intent of challenged speech, courts can
ensure a methodical-albeit often difficult-consideration of evidence
indicating whether speech deserves protection.
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